Abstract-We present a novel way to compare the statistical cost of privacy mechanisms using their Dobrushin coefficient. Specifically, we provide upper and lower bounds for the Dobrushin coefficient of a privacy mechanism in terms of its maximal leakage and local differential privacy guarantees. Given the geometric nature of the Dobrushin coefficient, this approach provides some insights into the general statistical cost of these privacy guarantees. We highlight the strength of this method by applying our results to develop new bounds on the ℓ2-minimax risk in a distribution estimation setting under maximal leakage constraints. Specifically, we find its order with respect to the sample size and privacy level, allowing a quantitative comparison with the corresponding local differential privacy ℓ2-minimax risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, several compelling definitions for privacy have arisen, notable among them are the context-free (statistics agnostic) notion of differential privacy and the context-aware information-theoretic measures such as mutual information and maximal leakage. Context-aware approaches provide average-case privacy guarantees and allow for a range of adversarial models.
Both context-free and context-aware definitions of privacy require designing a probabilistic mapping (henceforth referred to as privacy mechanism) that satisfies the desired privacy requirement. Despite the operational interpretations, comparing privacy leakage measures numerically does not provide much insight. One approach is to evaluate the effect of the privacy requirement on utility (i.e., the statistical cost of using the corresponding privacy mechanism). The aim of this paper is to provide a framework in which different privacy metrics can be compared in terms of their general statistical cost.
We compare different privacy mechanisms via their Dobrushin coefficient, which is equal to the contractivity coefficient of the mechanism with respect to total variation distance. Specifically, we provide upper bounds on the privacy guarantees of a local differentially private (L-DP) mechanism and a maximal leakage (MaxL) private mechanism in terms of its Dobrushin coefficient. Conversely, we provide upper bounds on the Dobrushin coefficient of any mechanism in terms of its L-DP and MaxL privacy guarantees. Since a small Dobrushin coefficient means a highly contractive mapping, the latter bounds are particularly useful to assess the cost of both aforementioned privacy guarantees for a wide range of statistical problems, including hypothesis testing and distribution This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CCF-1350914 and an ASU seed grant.
estimation. More specifically, the Dobrushin coefficient can be used to provide strong data processing inequalities (SDPIs) for any f -divergence. Since these SDPIs are a fundamental part of many standard statistical methodologies, e.g., Le Cam's method, the Dobrushin coefficient leads to an immediate evaluation of the statistical cost of a privacy mapping.
We highlight the value of this approach by presenting new results on the ℓ 2 -minimax risk for a distribution estimation setting under MaxL constraints, i.e., we compute the best worst-case expected ℓ 2 -loss of a distribution estimator when using data sanitized by a privacy mechanism with specific MaxL guarantees. We show that the minimax risk order with respect to the sample size n and privacy level α has order (n(2 α − 1)) −1 . This is the first step to enable quantitative comparisons with the corresponding local differential private minimax risk (see, for example, [1] - [3] ). The value of this approach is in exploiting the connection between the Dobrushin coefficient and Le Cam's method to obtain bounds more directly. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the main concepts and terminology used in this paper. In Section III we present our main results regarding the relation between L-DP or MaxL privacy guarantees and the Dobrushin coefficient of privacy mechanisms, and illustrate some of their consequences in Section IV. In Section V we apply our results to study the ℓ 2 -minimax risk of a distribution estimation problem under maximal leakage constraints. The proof of our main results are provided in Appendix A.
II. PROBLEM SETTING AND PRELIMINARIES

A. Privacy Notions
We assume that X and Y are finite sets. A privacy mechanism is a function W : X × Y → R such that W (x, y) ≥ 0 for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y and, for all x ∈ X , y∈Y W (x, y) = 1.
(
Let P(Z) be the set of probability measures on a discrete set Z. Every privacy mechanism W : X × Y → R can be identified with a mapping W ′ : P(X ) → P(Y) determined by
Note that this correspondence defines a bijection. Thus, by abuse of notation, we denote by W both W and W ′ . 
For convenience, we define 0/0 := 1 and 1/0 := ∞. Following tradition, all logarithms are taken in base 2.
The operational significance of Def. 2 comes from the following result of Issa et al. [5] .
Proposition 1 ([5])
. Let X and Y be random variables with support X and Y, respectively. Define
where the support of U is finite but of arbitrary size, andÛ (Y ) is the maximum a posteriori estimator. Then,
The Dobrushin coefficient of a probabilistic mapping is defined as follows.
B. Dobrushin Coefficient
For P, Q ∈ P(Z), their total variation distance is given by
In [6] , Dobrushin provided the next characterization for α(W ).
Proposition 2 ([6]). For every mapping
It is straightforward to verify that the right hand side of (9) is upper bounded by one for every W . In particular, α(W ) is the constant of the contractive mapping W .
Note that when α(W ) is close to zero, the output of the mapping W is essentially the same for every input distribution. This cause severe degradation to the utility of any statistical methodology applied to the output of this mapping. Thus, this geometric feature of the Dobrushin coefficient offers a quantitative assessment of the statistical cost of a mapping.
C. f -Divergences
Another important property of the Dobrushin coefficient comes from its connection with f -divergences.
For W :
For example, f (x) = x log(x) leads to the KL-divergence,
For this choice of f it is customary to denote η f by η KL . Similarly, when f (x) = |x − 1|/2, it is easy to show that D f (P Q) = P − Q . In this case, η f is usually denoted by η TV . With this notation, Proposition 2 says that
In the sequel, η TV and α are used interchangeably. Remarkably, η TV is an upper bound for η f for every f , see, for example, [7, Prop. II.4.10].
Proposition 3 ([7]). For every
In particular, we have that η KL (W ) ≤ η TV (W ). Therefore, for every privacy mechanism W and P 0 , P 1 ∈ P(X ),
This inequality will be used to derive a lower bound for the ℓ 2 -minimax risk in a distribution estimation setting under maximal leakage constraints. We finish this section pointing out that more refined contraction coefficients have been the subject of recent studies, see, for example, [8] , [9] and references therein.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Local Differential Privacy
The following theorem provides an upper bound for the Dobrushin coefficient of a privacy mechanism in terms of its L-DP guarantee.
Theorem 1. If a privacy mechanism W is α-locally differentially private, then
In [10, Corollary 11], Kairouz et al. obtained Thm. 1 as a by-product of the characterization of the set of optimal mechanisms for a certain type of optimization problems under L-DP constraints. In this work, such a characterization is not required in order to establish (16). This new approach provides an alternative to study privacy notions for which optimal mechanisms are not easily computable, for example, maximal leakage.
The following theorem provides a converse to Theorem 1, i.e., provides an upper bound for the L-DP guarantee of a privacy mechanism in terms of its Dobrushin coefficient.
Theorem 2. For every privacy mechanism
where
After some manipulations, Theorems 1 and 2 imply that, for every privacy mechanism W ,
(18) As shown in the sequel, both bounds can be tight. These inequalities show the connection between the local differential privacy guarantee and the contraction properties of a privacy mechanism.
B. Maximal Leakage (MaxL) based Privacy
The following theorem provides an upper bound for the Dobrushin coefficient of a privacy mechanism in terms of its MaxL privacy guarantee. 
The following theorem provides a converse to Theorem 3, i.e., provides an upper bound for the MaxL guarantee of a privacy mechanism in terms of its Dobrushin coefficient.
Theorem 4. For every privacy mechanism
In particular, Theorems 3 and 4 imply that,
for every privacy mechanism W . Note that when |X | = 2, (21) reduces to an equality. The inequalities in (21) show the intrinsic relation between the MaxL privacy guarantee of a privacy mechanism and its Dobrushin coefficient.
IV. ILLUSTRATION
A. Local Differential Privacy
Assume that X = Y = {1, . . . , k}. Consider the randomized response mechanism W k,α : P(X ) → P(Y) defined by
Note that W k,α is α-locally differentially private. A straightforward computation shows that, for all P 0 , P 1 ∈ P(X ),
and thus
. The fact that (23) holds for all P 0 , P 1 ∈ P(X ) shows that the randomized response mechanism contracts the space P(X ) in a uniform way. This is a desirable property in terms of statistical utility. For the binary setting,
thus illustrating a case where the bound in Theorem 1 is tight. Also, note that (W 2,α ) * = (2 α + 1) −1 . Thus implying that the bound in Theorem 2 is also tight.
B. Maximal Leakage Privacy
α . Consider the privacy mechanism
Clearly, Z α is α-MaxL private. Furthermore, a straightforward computation shows that, for all P 0 , P 1 ∈ P({0, 1}),
Hence, η TV (Z α ) = 1 − ζ α = 2 α − 1. This type of Z-channel mechanism has proved to be optimal for some problems under maximal leakage constraints; see, for example, Liao et al. [11] in the context of hypothesis testing.
V. MAXIMAL LEAKAGE ℓ 2 -MINIMAX RISK
In this section we analyze the maximal leakage ℓ 2 -minimax risk, adapting the notion of local differential private minimax risk in [2] . In particular, we provide lower and upper bounds for the α-MaxL ℓ 2 -minimax risk with matching orders with respect to the sample size and privacy level. A detailed treatment of the non-private version of this problem can be found in [12] . For probability distributions P, Q ∈ P(Z), we let P −Q 2 be their ℓ 2 -distance, i.e.,
Let ∆ k be the set of distributions over [k] := {1, . . . , k}. By definition, the ℓ 2 -minimax risk of a privacy mechanism W :
where the infimum is over all the estimatorsP : [m] n → ∆ k and E W,P (Z) denotes expectation of Z when Y 1 , . . . , Y n are i.i.d. with distribution W (P ). For α ∈ [0, ∞], we define the α-MaxL ℓ 2 -minimax risk as
where D α denotes the set of all privacy mechanisms which are α-MaxL private. The next proposition provides a lower bound for r .
By providing an achievability scheme, we provide an upper bound for r
Note that when 2 α > k, the constraint in Def. 2 becomes vacuous. By Propositions 4 and 5,
.
The notation f (n, α) = Θ k (g(n, α)) denotes that there exists N = N (k, α) such that, for all n > N ,
where C 1 , C 2 > 0 are constants depending only on k. In particular, the MaxL ℓ 2 -minimax risk is smaller than its L-DP counterpart, see [3, Thm. II.5],
Proof of Proposition 4. Let P 0 ∈ ∆ k be the uniform distribution over [k], i.e., P 0 (x) = k −1 for all x ∈ [k]. For a given vector u ∈ R k such that x u x = 0 and x u 2 x = 1, let P 1 ∈ ∆ k be the distribution determined by
Note that if n ≥ k 2 /(2 α − 1), then P 1 indeed defines a probability distribution. A direct computation shows that
Fix an α-MaxL private mechanism W : ∆ k → ∆ m . For a given estimatorP , let
Let KP := {y n ∈ [m] n : P (y n ) − P 0 2 ≥ P (y n ) − P 1 2 }. By (36) and the triangle inequality, for y n ∈ KP ,
and, for y n ∈ K cP ,
Also, observe that
where W (P 0 ) n (KP ) denotes the measure of KP with respect to the n-fold tensor product measure W (P 0 ) ⊗ · · · ⊗ W (P 0 ). Using a similar argument, we obtain that
Recall that P (E) + Q(E c ) ≥ 1 − P − Q for every event E. In particular,
where the last inequality follows from Pinsker's inequality and the tensorization property of the KL-divergence. By (15) and Theorem 3, we obtain that
(46) A Taylor series expansion argument shows that for n large enough n(2 α − 1)D KL (P 1 P 0 ) ≤ 1, and hence
Note that sup
(48) By (47), we obtain that
Since this inequality holds for any given α-MaxL private mechanism W , the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 5.
It is immediate to verify that W is α-MaxL private. Hence, (29) readily implies that
Also, letP be the estimator determined bŷ
Hence, by (28) and (51),
We now estimate the right hand side term of (53). For a given P ∈ ∆ k , we let Q = W (P ) be the common distribution of Y 1 , . . . , Y n . Note that Q(x) = λP (x) for all x ∈ [k]. In particular,
Since (57) holds for every P ∈ ∆ k , by (53) the result follows.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have introduced a novel way to compare the statistical costs of any privacy mechanism via the Dobrushin coefficient. A significant advantage of this approach is that it eliminates the need to compute the precise mechanism for any privacy definition, which is often times difficult to obtain in closed form. Many questions remain to be addressed including tighter bounds for distribution estimation under MaxL constraints as well as application to other statistical problems with different privacy requirements.
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APPENDIX A PROOFS OF THE MAIN RESULTS
A. Local Differential Privacy Results
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following elementary observation. Lemma 1. If a privacy mechanism W is α-locally differentially private, then, for all x 1 , x 2 ∈ X and y ∈ Y,
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that W (x 1 , y) ≥ W (x 2 , y). Note that (58) holds true if and only if
(59) As the later holds if and only if W (x 1 , y) ≤ 2 α W (x 2 , y), and W is α-locally differentially private, the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 1. For x 1 , x 2 ∈ X , we define
Note that for every
By the Lemma 1, we have that
By (7), we obtain that η TV (W )
, as required.
Proof of Theorem 2. Without loss of generality, assume that
for some x 1 , x 2 ∈ X and y 0 ∈ Y. For ease of notation, let η = η TV (W ). By (7),
In particular, we have that
(67) An elementary computation shows that
and hence
The result follows.
B. Maximal Leakage Privacy Results
Proof of Thm. 3. For x 1 , x 2 ∈ X , we define 
we have that 
where the last equality follows from the definition of Y ± . Note that for all y ∈ Y, max{W (x 1 , y), W (x 2 , y)} ≤ max x W (x, y).
Hence, S(x 1 , x 2 ) ≤ S(x 1 , x 2 ) ≤ 2 α − 1.
Since η TV (W ) ≤ 1 for every mapping W : P(X ) → P(Y), the result follows.
Before proceeding with the proof of Theorem 4, we prove the following elementary lemma. k > 1 and a 1 , . . . , a k are non-negative real numbers, then there exist i 1 = i 2 such that
Lemma 2. If
Proof. Let s = a 1 + · · · + a k . In order to reach contradiction, assume that a i1 + a i2 2 < s k for all i 1 = i 2 . In this case,
where the last equality follows from the fact that
In a similar way, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, |{(i 1 , i 2 ) : i 1 = i 2 , i 1 = i or i 2 = i}| = 2(k − 1).
